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NATIONS

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22 September 1993
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 31 of the provisional agenda*
THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 21 September 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the French and English versions of a statement on Haiti issued by the European Community and its member States on 20 September 1993 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 31 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of
Belgium to the United Nations

* A/48/150 and Corr.1.

ANNEX

Statement on Haiti issued by the European Community and its member States on 20 September 1993

The European Community and its member States express their indignation at the series of assassinations of supporters of President Aristide and at the threats made against members of the constitutional Government and political activists who are in favour of the return of the President.

The European Community and its member States condemn such violence, which runs counter to the national reconciliation to be achieved on the basis of the Governor's Island agreement. They stress the obligation to maintain order which is incumbent on the army and the police and demand that those responsible be prosecuted and punished.

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S/26483
22 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 845 (1993)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 3243rd meeting on 18 June 1993 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 845 (1993) by which, inter alia, the Council:

> "...
>
> "Recalling its resolution 817 (1993) of 7 April 1993, in which it urged Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference, ...
>
> "2. Urges the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them;
>
> "3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress of these further efforts, the objective of which is to resolve the difference between the two parties before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report to the Council on their outcome in good time, and decides to resume consideration of the matter in the light of the report."

2. On adoption of resolution 845 (1993) I asked Mr. Cyrus Vance, former Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to continue his mission of good offices. On 15 July I informed the Security Council that Mr. Vance had accepted my request, and that he would begin his assignment on 1 August 1993. 1/

II. REVIEW OF DISCUSSIONS

3. Since undertaking his current assignment, Mr. Vance has held a series of separate meetings with the parties which led to their first direct meeting under his auspices. In accordance with the terms of resolution 845 (1993) the

proposals contained in annex V of the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 817 (1993), 2/ which contained a draft Treaty Confirming the Existing Frontier and Establishing Measures for Confidence Building, Friendship and Neighbourly Cooperation proposed by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on 14 May 1993, served as a basis for these discussions.

4. On 11 and 12 August Mr. Vance met with the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Stevo Crvenkovski, and the former Foreign Minister Mr. Denko Maleski. On 22 August he met with a delegation of Greece led by Ambassador George D. Papoulias, Special Envoy. On 23 August he met with a delegation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia led by Ambassador Ivan Tosevski, Special Envoy of the President.

5. Following these separate meetings with the two sides, the parties, represented by Ambassador Tosevski and Ambassador Papoulias and their delegations, met for the first time together for direct discussions in Mr. Vance's presence on 23 August.

6. The direct discussions focused on Mr. Vance's proposed schedule for ongoing, direct talks at New York under his auspices. He proposed that continuous, direct and high-level discussions begin on 28 September 1993. In the separate meetings and in their direct discussions, both sides expressed strong support for this proposal and assured Mr. Vance that they did so with the full confidence that it was acceptable to the leadership at the highest levels of their Governments. The parties also approved a joint statement which was released immediately to the press at United Nations Headquarters (annex I).

7. The direct meeting on 23 August took place in a cordial and cooperative atmosphere. Both sides welcomed this "new phase" in the effort to resolve their remaining differences which they hoped would lead to a "new era" in their relations. Pending the commencement of ongoing, direct talks, both delegations reserved their positions as reflected in the statement by the Government of Greece 3/ and in the letter of the President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the Secretary-General dated 29 May 1993. 4/

III. OBSERVATIONS

8. While it has not proved possible to resolve the difference between the two parties before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as called for in resolution 845 (1993), their direct meeting in the presence of Mr. Vance and their agreement to enter into ongoing, direct discussions under his auspices demonstrate the desire on both sides to come to a resolution of the differences between them. Normalization of relations between these two States would contribute to peace and stability in the region.

9. As members of the Council will be aware, on 9 September the Prime Minister of Greece announced the dissolution of Parliament. Elections have been called for 10 October. The Greek authorities have said that this development will not affect the direct talks which will take place as scheduled at the end of September.

10. Mr. Vance and I continue to stand ready to assist the parties in their efforts to resolve their difference. In the meantime, I strongly urge both sides to continue their own efforts towards building mutual confidence and to refrain from any action which might contribute to tension between them.

Notes

1/ S/26088.

2/ S/25855.

3/ S/25855/Add.1.

4/ S/25855/Add.2.

Annex

JOINT STATEMENT

[By the delegations of Greece and of the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]

On 23 August 1993 delegations of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, headed respectively by Ambassador George D. Papoulias, Special Envoy, and Ambassador Ivan Tosevski, Special Envoy, met together at New York under the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance. At Mr. Vance's suggestion, which both parties warmly welcomed, they have agreed to commence direct discussions on a continuing basis in Mr. Vance's presence at New York on 28 September 1993, to be followed in due course by a visit of Mr. Vance to Athens and Skopje. These direct and continuous discussions will mark a new phase in the effort to resolve the differences between the parties, in accordance with Security Council resolution 845 (1993).

Pending the opening of the discussions on 28 September, both parties reserve their positions, as stated in United Nations documents S/25855/Add.1 and S/25855/Add.2.

The parties wish to express their deep appreciation to Mr. Vance for his tireless efforts in pursuing his mission of good offices.

New York City, 23 August 1993

UNITED
NATIONS

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S/26484
23 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 861 (1993) of 27 August 1993 and 862 (1993) of 31 August 1993,

Recalling also relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Organization of American States,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 21 September 1993 (S/26480 and Add.1), and the reports of the Secretary-General of 25 August 1993 (S/26352) and 26 August 1993 (S/26361), submitted pursuant to his reports to the Security Council dated 12 July 1993 (S/26063) and 13 August 1993 (S/26297),

Taking note of the letter dated 24 July 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/26180) conveying a proposal from the Government of Haiti requesting the United Nations to provide assistance in creating a new police force and in modernizing the Haitian armed forces,

Stressing the importance of the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993 (S/26063) between the President of the Republic of Haiti and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti towards promoting the return of peace and stability in Haiti, including the provisions of paragraph 5, under which the parties call for assistance for modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force with the presence of United Nations personnel in these fields,

Strongly supportive of the efforts to implement that Agreement, and to permit the resumption of the normal operations of Government in Haiti, including police and military functions, under civilian control,

Recalling the situation in Haiti and the continuing responsibility of the Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Concerned about the escalation of politically motivated violence in Haiti at this time of critical political transition, and recalling in this respect the statement of the President of the Security Council of 17 September 1993 (S/26460),

Considering that there is an urgent need to ensure conditions for the full implementation of the Governors Island Agreement and the political accords contained in the New York Pact as contained in the annex to the report of the Secretary-General of 13 August 1993 (S/26297),

1. Approves the recommendation of the Secretary-General contained in his report of 21 September 1993 (S/26480) and his report of 25 August 1993 (S/26352) to authorize the establishment and immediate dispatch of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period of six months subject to the proviso that it will be extended beyond seventy-five days only upon a review by the Council to be based on a report from the Secretary-General on whether or not substantive progress has been made towards the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement and the political accords contained in the New York Pact;

2. Decides that, in accordance with the report of 21 September 1993, the United Nations Mission shall be comprised of up to 567 United Nations police monitors (UNPMS) and a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 700, including 60 military trainers;

3. Determines that the UNPMS shall provide guidance and training to all levels of the Haitian police and monitor the way in which the operations are implemented in accordance with paragraph 9 of the report of the Secretary-General of 21 September 1993;

4. Also determines that the military component of the Mission in charge of modernization of the armed forces shall have the following roles:

(a) The military training teams shall provide non-combat training, as outlined in paragraph 17 of the report of the Secretary-General of 21 September 1993, to meet requirements determined through coordination between the Chief of the United Nations Mission and the Government of Haiti;

(b) The military construction unit will work with the Haitian military to carry out projects, as specified in paragraph 15 of the report of the Secretary-General of 25 August 1993 and as described in paragraph 16 of his report of 21 September 1993;

5. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to place the peace-keeping mission under the oversight of the Special Representative of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, who also oversees the activities of the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH), so that the peace-keeping mission may benefit from the experience and information already obtained by MICIVIH;

6. Calls upon the Government of Haiti to take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety of United Nations personnel, as well as to ensure the freedom of movement and communication of the Mission and its members as well as the other rights necessary for the performance of its task, and in this regard urges the conclusion at the earliest possible stage of a Status of Mission Agreement;

7. Notes that such safety and freedoms are a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the Mission, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council in the event such conditions do not exist;

8. Calls upon all factions in Haiti explicitly and publicly to renounce, and to direct their supporters to renounce violence as a means of political expression;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch the United Nations Mission in Haiti on an urgent basis;

10. Encourages the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund or make other arrangements to assist in the financing of the Mission, along the lines and conditions outlined in paragraph 26 of the report of the Secretary-General of 21 September 1993, and to seek for this purpose pledges and contributions from Member States and others, and encourages Member States to make voluntary contributions to this fund;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to seek contributions of personnel from Member States for the civilian police and military components of the Mission, as specified in paragraph 18 of his report of 25 August 1993;

12. Expresses the hope that States will assist the legally constituted Government of Haiti in carrying out actions consistent with the restoration of democracy as called for by the Governors Island Accord, the New York Pact and other relevant resolutions and agreements;

13. Expresses its appreciation for the constructive role of the Organization of American States in cooperation with the United Nations in promoting the solution of the political crisis and the restoration of democracy in Haiti and, in this context, stresses the importance of ensuring close coordination between the United Nations and the Organization of American States in their work in Haiti;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to submit progress reports to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution by 10 December 1993 and 25 January 1994, thus keeping the Council fully informed on actions taken to implement the Mission;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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S/26485
23 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the enclosed text of a letter dated 15 September 1993 from His Excellency Mr. Stanislav Daskalov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, addressed to you.

I would appreciate it if this letter and its attachment could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Slavi PASHOVSKI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 15 September 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria addressed to the Secretary-General

On the eve of the convening of the forty-eighth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, it is a great pleasure and honour for me to inform you that Bulgaria envisages active participation in its work, focusing its efforts on the strengthening and maintenance of international peace and security with special regard to the situation in the Balkans.

It is my firm belief that the imposition of economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is of vital importance for the endeavours of the international community to work out a just and lasting peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis.

Notwithstanding the extremely heavy commercial and financial losses incurred by Bulgaria, our unwavering and effective compliance with the sanctions has been widely recognized by international institutions, leading world politicians and the international mass media. At the same time Bulgaria's economic situation has often been described as the "gravest" of all the Eastern European countries.

In the aftermath of tightened United Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which have aggravated the critical economic situation of my country even more, the recommendation by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia with regard to Bulgaria of 2 July 1993 is highly appreciated. The Security Council Committee recognizes the urgent need to assist Bulgaria in coping with its special economic problems and appeals to all States, on an urgent basis, to provide immediate technical, financial and material assistance to Bulgaria to mitigate the adverse impact on its economy. However, there is little indication that this urgent appeal for assistance is being translated into practical help for Bulgaria's beleaguered economy.

In this regard I should be very grateful if you could request from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Development Programme and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development any relevant information concerning their assessments of the impact of the carrying out of the Security Council resolutions on the economy of Bulgaria, as well as suggestions regarding ways and means of addressing its special economic problems.

I share the view that all of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations are of equal value and importance for the effective carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures envisaged therein. These provisions should be interpreted and implemented in their integrity. Article 50 of the Charter could be supplemented by appropriate arrangements creating obligations for concrete assistance to third States affected by mandatory sanctions of the Security Council.

I expect these vital issues to be the subject of further productive discussions and considerations during the forthcoming session. In the meantime I shall be most grateful for your support of our requests for substantial improvement of the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia with regard to requests for authorizations placed by Bulgarian companies, which should be treated with the necessary expediency and efficiency.

I also hope that the measures and procedures proposed by the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria for effective implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions in the case of transshipments through the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be approved, providing thereby some indirect support for the shattered national economy and the emerging Bulgarian private sector, most acutely suffering under the sanctions.

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my highest esteem for your dedicated efforts for the revitalization of the work of the United Nations and to assure you that Bulgaria shall continue to pursue its constructive and positive activities aimed at strengthening the role and enhancing the credibility of the Organization during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Stanislav DASKALOV

UNITED
NATIONS

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S/26486
23 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached report addressed to me on 21 September 1993 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia on the latest developments in the search for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee on the activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION

1. The previous report of the Co-Chairmen, which the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council on 1 September 1993 (S/26395) dealt with the peace talks held in Geneva on 31 August and 1 September. In that report the Co-Chairmen indicated that on 1 September they had put to the parties a peace package distilled from the parties' own ideas. The Croat delegation was ready to sign the package. The Serb delegation was also ready to sign. President Izetbegovic, however, still wanted further consideration of the question of access to the Adriatic sea and of some territorial issues.

2. Noting that the choice was between a negotiated peace and the continuation of war, the Co-Chairmen warned of the danger that further conflict could take place and that it could even intensify and expand. Fighting has indeed persisted, especially in central Bosnia and around Mostar, where a number of new offensives appear to have been launched.

3. Since the submission of the preceding report, the Co-Chairmen have maintained contacts with the three sides, as well as with Presidents Bulatovic, Milosevic and Tudjman. The Co-Chairmen shuttled among them, holding meetings in Geneva, Zagreb, Podgorica, Skopje and Belgrade. The Co-Chairmen concentrated their efforts on improving relations among the parties, on the question of the access of the Muslim-majority Republic to the Adriatic Sea and on outstanding territorial questions. In the light of their contacts with the parties, the Co-Chairmen invited them to a meeting aboard HMS Invincible in the Adriatic Sea, on 20 September 1993. All three parties attended, led by President Izetbegovic, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban. Presidents Bulatovic, Milosevic and Tudjman were also present. Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin of the Russian Federation and Ambassador Charles Redman of the United States of America were present as observers.

I. IMPROVING RELATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES

4. Since the last report of the Co-Chairmen was issued, there have been some promising political developments, even if the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has not abated. On 14 September, President Izetbegovic and President Tudjman met in Geneva and issued a joint declaration agreeing to the formation of a working group for matters related to territorial delimitation between the Muslim-majority Republic and the Croat-majority Republic in the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including access to the sea, as a matter of common developmental interest. They also agreed on a cessation of all hostilities and military conflicts between the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) immediately, and by no later than 18 September 1993, at 1200 hours but unfortunately, as has so often been the case in the past, this was not respected.

5. On 16 September, President Izetbegovic met in Geneva with Mr. Karadzic's representative, Momcilo Krajisnik. They also agreed to a joint declaration and agreed to form a working group for outstanding matters related to the territorial delimitation between the Muslim-majority Republic and the Serb-majority Republic in the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the areas of Brcko, Bosanska Krajina, the Neretva Valley, eastern Bosnia at the Ozren mountain, including the natural right of the two Republics to access to the sea. This was in addition to the commitment already made to find a permanent solution to the governance of Sarajevo District within two years. They also agreed on the prompt cessation of all hostilities and military conflicts between the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army immediately, and by no later than 18 September 1993, at 1200 hours. They also agreed to establish direct communications (hot lines) between military commanders at all levels. Fighting between Serbs and Muslims remains at a relatively low level.

6. The Serb and Croat sides have indicated that they plan to meet and to issue a similar declaration.

II. ACCESS TO THE SEA

7. In view of the importance attached to providing the Muslim-majority Republic with access to the Adriatic Sea, arrangements were made for a team of experts from France and Germany to study the possibilities of building a commercial port in the coastal area between Ploce and Neum. In a report dated 20 September, which reached the Co-Chairmen the same day, the experts stated that they could not recommend the building of a port in Neum or on the peninsula of Kosa, in which the Muslim side had expressed interest. They recommended the use of a port in Ploce as a base on the Adriatic Sea with connection to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Neretva river. That would allow traffic to come from overseas to Ploce and then to an inland port, for example Visici/Celjevo as a port of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with river/seagoing vessels going directly to the Mediterranean Sea, e.g. for general cargo.

8. The experts saw no possibility for constructing a new port in Neum, since there was no available area and the city and its narrow surrounding areas were built on a rocky slope. The road access to the hinterland was not sufficient. There was no railway line to the area of Neum and it was impossible to build a railway line to the city to serve a port. Moreover, the entrance to the bay of Neum was very small and covered with rocky islands, so that ships would have difficulties manoeuvring. Tug-boat services and pilotage would be necessary.

9. Furthermore, the city of Neum, as well as the northern part of the bay and parts of the Mali Ston canal, was a tourist area. The main business was tourism. It was a sensitive area, owing to the fact that the current in the canal was not strong and the exchange of water with the Adriatic Sea was low. As a result of this, the ecological situation in the bay was sensitive and would react quickly to any negative environmental impact. The Mali Ston canal and the bay of Neum was, in the eyes of many environmentalists, a natural reserve and many international environmental associations were interested in protecting the area.

10. Against the background of this information, as well as of related contacts, the Co-Chairmen discussed with President Tudjman, on 18 September 1993, the possibility of the Republic of Croatia granting a 99-year lease to enable a port to be built in Ploce for the use of the Muslim-majority Republic. After consideration of various options, President Tudjman accepted that a draft lease-agreement be prepared.

11. At the meeting on HMS Invincible on 20 September 1993, the following agreements were reached:

(a) The Muslim and Croat parties agreed on the establishment of an exit to the sea for the Muslim-majority Republic through the Croat-majority Republic via the Access Authority Throughway from Poplat to Neum and for the Muslim-majority Republic to hold a tract of land on the shore of the Adriatic on the isthmus of Kosa (Klek) and establish a joint authority between the two Republics to develop the tourist industry in that area;

(b) The Croat and Muslim parties agreed that a port facility for the Muslim-majority Republic should be between Visici and Celjevo on the Neretva, capable of taking vessels transshipping from Ploce and also directly from other ports in the Adriatic, and that the southern border of the Muslim-majority Republic should be moved down from Recice to just above Visici. Initially there would be an Access Authority Throughway along the road from Recice to Tasovcici and to the turn-off to Celjevo. The land for the port would be defined as being south of the houses along the road to Celjevo, west of the houses along the road to Vesici, to the north of the built-up area of Visici and then following the east bank of the Neretva River. If the port was developed, the Muslim-majority Republic would be expected to build a flyover at the Celjevo crossroad and a new road along an agreed route to Recice, avoiding as far as possible existing settlements, and this road, with the land one half a kilometre on either side, and the port area would be part of the Muslim-majority Republic;

(c) The Republic of Croatia agreed to a 99-year lease for a separate port facility for the Muslim-majority Republic at the port of Ploce. The details governing this port facility are set out in the agreement to be concluded between the Republic of Croatia and the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina as set out in the appendix to the present report;

(d) It was further agreed among the parties that, as soon as relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were normalized, there should be a treaty covering an exchange of territory involving also the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take account of the need for strategic assurances for Dubrovnik and of the strategic importance of Prevlaka to the Bay of Kotor, the need for the Serb-majority Republic to have access to the sea in the area between Ostri Rt and Molunat, and the need for the Republic of Croatia to be compensated with territory so that there would be no net loss of territory to the Republic of Croatia.

III. TERRITORIAL ISSUES

12. As the Co-Chairmen stated in their report of 1 September 1993, the Serb and the Croat sides have maintained the view that they have already made many concessions on territorial issues to the Muslim side on the understanding that the peace package of 1 September was final. They have stated categorically that, if the peace package is not signed soon by the Muslim side, they would withdraw their concessions.

13. Notwithstanding this, the Co-Chairmen continued to explore with the parties avenues for arriving at an agreed settlement. During the meeting held on HMS Invincible on 20 September 1993 the following further agreements were reached on territorial issues:

(a) As part of the arrangements to provide a port facility for the Muslim-majority Republic, the southern border of the Muslim-majority Republic will be moved down from Recice to just above Visici;

(b) The Serb side agreed that the Muslim-majority Republic should have an additional area of land along the banks of the Drina river between Gorazde and Visegrad.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

14. In the light of the agreements reached on access for the Muslim-majority Republic to the Adriatic Sea and of the addition of territory for the Muslim-majority Republic, President Izetbegovic stated at the meeting on 20 September 1993 that he would put the peace package to an extended meeting of the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be held on Monday, 27 September 1993.

Appendix

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE UNION OF REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA GRANTING THE UNION ACCESS TO THE ADRIATIC THROUGH THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

The Republic of Croatia
and
The Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Considering that it is desirable that Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter the "Union") and in particular the Muslim-majority Republic have assured and unrestricted access to the Adriatic Sea on the surface and in the air through and over the territory of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter "Croatia")

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

(a) Croatia shall lease to the Muslim-majority Republic for the duration of this Agreement the plot of land within the Port of Ploce, including the docks and the parts of the harbour pertaining thereto described in Annex A hereto (hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Area").

(b) Croatia agrees that the Leased Area shall enjoy the status of a free zone, in which no duties or taxes imposed by Croatia shall apply.

Article 2

(a) Croatia shall allow access to and from the Leased Area:

(i) By ships from the Adriatic Sea, through the territorial waters of Croatia, subject to such ships complying with any applicable international regulations;

(ii) By ships or barges up the Neretva River up to the point where that River enters the territory of the Muslim-majority Republic;

(iii) By railroad on the line between Ploce to Sarajevo up to the point where that railroad line enters the territory of the Union;

(iv) By road between Ploce to Sarajevo up to the point where that road enters the territory of the Union.

(b) Ships, barges, railroad cars, and trucks and other road vehicles using the routes referred to in paragraph (a) that carry the flag of the Union or are marked by an emblem of the Union or of the Muslim-majority Republic shall not be entered or inspected by any public authority of Croatia.

(c) Limits on the sizes and specifications of the characteristics of the ships, barges, railroad cars and trucks and other road vehicles referred to in paragraph (b) and of the volume of traffic on the routes referred to in paragraph (a) may be set by the Joint Commission established in accordance with article 4.

(d) Should the limits set in accordance with paragraph (c) restrict the volume of traffic that the Muslim-majority Republic considers it necessary to maintain, then it may, at its cost and in accordance with plans approved by the Joint Commission, arrange for the capacity of the routes referred to in paragraph (a) to be increased.

(e) With respect to any traffic of persons or goods carried out pursuant to this article, all responsibilities for compliance with international laws and obligations shall be assumed by the Muslim-majority Republic or the Union.

Article 3

Croatia grants to the Union and in particular to the Muslim-majority Republic the right to authorize any types of aircraft to overfly the territory of Croatia, including its territorial waters, along the corridor specified in annex B hereto, subject to such aircraft complying with any applicable international air traffic regulations.

Article 4

(a) The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission to assist in implementing the present Agreement by:

(i) Establishing any rules and standards required for implementing the agreement, and in particular article 2 (c), including for any construction;

(ii) Arrange for any monitoring required to prevent abuses of the Agreement;

(iii) Settle, subject to article 6, any disputes regarding the interpretation or the application of the Agreement.

(b) Croatia and the Muslim-majority Republic shall appoint three members each to the Joint Commission and they shall by joint agreement appoint three more members, one of whom shall be the Chairman. If no agreement can be reached on one or more of the joint appointments within three months, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall make those appointments at the request of either party.

(c) The Joint Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Its decisions shall require five concurring votes.

Article 5

The present Agreement is without prejudice to any rights or obligations flowing from the Preliminary Agreement between the Parties hereto for implementing the 1965 Convention on the Transit Trade of Land-Locked States or any agreement that may be concluded between the Parties to implement or to supersede that Preliminary Agreement.

Article 6

Unless otherwise agreed, any legal dispute concerning the interpretation of this Agreement may be submitted by either Party to the International Court of Justice.

Article 7

(a) This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of 99 years, except as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

(b) Should the Union be dissolved, it shall be succeeded as a Party to this Agreement by the Muslim-majority Republic.

DONE this _____ day of _____ 1993, in _____, in three copies, each in the English, Croatian and Serbian languages, which shall be equally authentic.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26487
26 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter CHKHEIDZE
Permanent Representative
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement issued on 23 September 1993 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia

A continued escalation of the military action unleashed by the separatists in violation of the Sochi cease-fire agreement of 27 July 1993 is taking place. It is particularly outrageous that the attack on inhabited areas in the conflict zone is being conducted after thousands of refugees who trusted in a peaceful settlement of the conflict had returned to the place of their birth.

As a result of the use of heavy military equipment by the Gudauta separatists, the civilian population is coming under concentrated fire, and Georgians, Abkhaz, Russians and Armenians are dying. The Republican hospital and the maternity ward in Sukhumi have been destroyed.

On 19 September, after capturing the village of Akhaldaba, the Abkhaz forces carried out a massacre in which 60 civilian inhabitants of the village, mainly women and children, were shot on the spot. The fate of the 600 people - elderly persons, women and children - driven into the Akhaldaba stadium is as yet unknown.

On 21 September, at 4.25 p.m., a TU-134 civilian aircraft from the Sukhumi air unit, on a flight from Sochi to Sukhumi, was hit, 5 kilometres from Sukhumi airport and at an altitude of 300 metres, by a heat-seeking missile fired from an Abkhaz gunboat. As a result of this barbaric act 21 passengers, including a child in arms, were killed, as well as the six members of the crew.

On 22 September, at 5.50 p.m., a TU-154 civilian airliner carrying supplies and medications to the besieged town was shot down by the same gunboat while landing at Sukhumi airport. The crew was able to land the blazing aircraft, but a tragedy could not be avoided, and 46 passengers died.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia registers a strong protest against such barbaric actions, which nullify all the efforts aimed at a renewal of the peace process, and calls on the world community and international organizations to condemn the outrages committed by the Gudauta authorities and to qualify these actions as a gross violation of human rights and a crime against peace and humanity.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RWANDA

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993. By paragraph 9 of that resolution, the Council urged the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement. Paragraph 11 of the same resolution requested me to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the implementation of such an agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decided that such a contribution was needed.

2. In my last report on Rwanda (S/26350), I informed the Security Council that the peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and RPF had been signed at Arusha (United Republic of Tanzania) on 4 August 1993. I indicated that the Government of Rwanda and RPF had called for the establishment of a neutral international force to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. I informed the Security Council that I had decided to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, in order to examine the functions that such a force could perform and to assess the human and financial resources that would be needed to carry them out. I stated that, in addition to Rwanda, the mission would also visit Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa for consultations with the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Secretary-General of OAU.

3. The reconnaissance mission, comprising officials of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) visited Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993. Its senior officials visited Dar-es-Salaam on 1 and 2 September and Addis Ababa on 3 September.

I. THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

4. The Council's attention is drawn to the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement and to those of its six protocols that are relevant to the Council's consideration of the contribution the United Nations could make towards the implementation of the agreement (see S/26350, para. 20).

5. The Protocols of Agreement on Power-sharing provides that the institutions for the transitional period, up to the elections for a democratically elected Government, will comprise a broad-based transitional Government with the participation of all main political parties. The major parties identified in the Agreements are the Mouvement républicain pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND), RPF, the Mouvement démocrate républicain (MDR), the Parti social démocrate (PSD), the Parti libéral (PL) and the Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC). The Transitional Assembly will be composed of members appointed by the various political parties.

6. Article 7 of the Agreement provides that the transitional institutions will be set up in Kigali 37 days after the signing of the Agreement, i.e. on 10 September 1993. However, this was based on the assumption that a neutral international force would be deployed by that date and that, with the arrival of that force, foreign troops stationed in Rwanda would withdraw. At that point, in accordance with the Agreement, RPF would deploy a battalion in Kigali to ensure the protection of its political leaders and to enable them to participate fully in the transitional institutions.

7. The Protocol of Agreement on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions states that the duration of the transitional period will be 22 months, with the possibility of one extension, which would have to be approved by a majority of 60 per cent of the Transitional Assembly.

8. The Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, including the Gendarmerie, specifically requests the assistance of a neutral international force led by the United Nations in the disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and retaining of the military personnel of the parties to be integrated in the national army. It also calls on the establishment of such a force to ensure the overall security of the country, especially the capital city of Kigali, as well as the protection of the expatriate community, and security of the continued distribution of humanitarian assistance.

9. The Protocol defines the neutral international force as a United Nations-led force, integrating as necessary the current OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II) and made up of countries representing a cross-section of the international community. The NMOG I force, made up of 50 personnel from OAU countries, monitored the cease-fire from July 1992 to July 1993. In early August 1993, the force was replaced by the NMOG II force, which is currently made up of 132 personnel from OAU member countries.

10. The Protocol on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons calls for the involvement of the United Nations in the repatriation of refugees and is elaborated upon below (see sect. III C).

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION

11. During its visit to Rwanda, the mission was led by Brigadier General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). Between 19 and 31 August 1993, the mission held consultations with the President of Rwanda, General Juvénal Habyarimana, and with the Chairman of RPF, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe,

as well as with other senior members of the Government and RPF, including Mrs. Agathe Uwiliugiyimana, current Prime Minister, Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, Prime Minister-designate of the broad-based transitional Government, and Mr. Paul Kagamé, Vice-Chairman of RPF and Commanding Officer of its armed forces. The mission also met with members of the diplomatic community accredited to Rwanda, with representatives of United Nations agencies and programmes and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) executing humanitarian projects in the country. The reconnaissance mission also met with the OAU representative in Rwanda and the Commanding Officer of NMOG II.

12. During their visit to Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa, the senior officials of the reconnaissance mission were joined by Mr. Macaire Pédanou, my Special Representative at the Arusha peace talks. They held consultations with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and other high officials of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and, in Addis Ababa, with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of OAU, and his senior staff.

13. One of the major points raised by all those with whom the mission met related to the deployment of a neutral international force by 10 September, the date set in the peace agreement for the installation of the transitional institutions in Kigali. The concern of all parties was that, should the neutral international force not be deployed in a timely manner, a political vacuum might occur if the transitional Government was not established in Kigali. The mission responded by clarifying the decision-making process at the United Nations and by stressing that the dispatch of a peace-keeping force to Rwanda would depend on a final determination by the Security Council. President Habyarimana felt that it would be dangerous and hazardous to set up the transitional Government before the arrival of the neutral international force and emphasized that such a force should be strong enough to be credible. For his part, Colonel Kanyarengwe, Chairman of RPF, stated that it was imperative that the security of RPF be ensured by the United Nations and expressed his concern that the vacuum caused by the absence of a United Nations peace-keeping mission might be filled by paramilitary groups in the country.

14. After the reconnaissance mission explained that it would not be realistic to expect the deployment of the proposed neutral international force by 10 September, a number of alternative measures were put forward by the parties and OAU. In addition, the role that an enlarged NMOG might play in the implementation of the agreements was discussed. In this connection, it should be noted that the OAU Secretary-General explained to the mission that he was planning to enlarge NMOG II to a total of approximately 240 all ranks, and that OAU did not have the resources to sustain a larger force. Mr. Salim pointed out that, even for the enlargement of NMOG II to the size of a company, OAU would have to rely, for logistic support, on the contributions of the donor countries which had assisted in the establishment of NMOG I. Most importantly, Mr. Salim informed the mission that the mandate of NMOG II would necessarily be confined to monitoring the cease-fire.

15. Mr. Salim recalled that the mandate of NMOG II would expire on 31 October 1993, adding that if the Security Council authorized United Nations involvement in the implementation of the peace agreement, the expeditious deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force would be essential. With regard to the possible integration of NMOG II into such a force, Mr. Salim

expressed the view that the United Nations would have to work out arrangements directly with troop-contributing countries.

16. It was also suggested that, since it was not feasible to meet the expectations of the two parties with regard to the deadline of 10 September for the installation of the transitional institutions, the United Nations should reassure the Rwandese people by giving a positive signal regarding its willingness to contribute to the restoration of peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda. In this connection, in a statement issued on 10 September 1993 (S/26425), the President of the Security Council pointed out that the Council was aware of the hopes the Rwandese parties entertained regarding the assistance that the international community would provide for the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. The President of the Council in his statement also urged the parties to continue to honour the Arusha agreement in accordance with their commitments.

17. Many of those with whom the reconnaissance mission held consultations, including representatives of the diplomatic community, felt that the Arusha accords constituted the best way for the Rwandese people to work together towards peace and stability. They also stressed the urgency of implementing those accords so that the people of Rwanda could proceed with the challenging tasks of reconstruction and economic development. The mission reported that most Governments represented in Rwanda also anxious to see a sound economic recovery programme instituted expressed their willingness to assist the Rwandese people in carrying out the task of economic recovery.

18. During its stay in Rwanda, the reconnaissance mission visited the areas controlled by RPF in the north, as well as government military positions and outposts. It carried out a detailed survey of the forces of the parties, including their respective structures and equipment, troop dispositions and topography, by land and by air. It received detailed briefings from the NMOG II Commander on the present status and role of NMOG II in Rwanda.

19. The mission discussed with the parties the tasks envisaged for the neutral international force in the Arusha agreement in order to determine the contribution that could be made by the United Nations. In particular, the mission undertook an assessment of the essential requirements that would enable the proposed force to execute its monitoring functions in Rwanda. This included an assessment of the following areas: cease-fire compliance in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), establishment of cantonment and assembly areas for weapons and personnel, mine-clearance, security of humanitarian aid efforts, return of the refugees and displaced persons, disarming and demobilization of armed personnel and restructuring of the Rwandese Defence Forces and the Gendarmerie.

20. In regard to relief assistance, the mission worked out arrangements that could enhance the various aspects of ongoing humanitarian activities described below (see sect. III C).

III. UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTION

A. Military aspects

21. The main provisions of the Arusha peace agreement relevant to the proposed United Nations peace-keeping mission (herein referred to as "the Mission") are contained in the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie. The principal functions of the Mission could be grouped in four categories: (a) to assist in ensuring the security of the city of Kigali, (b) to monitor the cease-fire agreement, including establishment of an expanded DMZ and demobilization procedures, (c) to continue to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to the elections, and (d) to assist with mine-clearance, including training and mine-awareness programmes.

22. Under article 64 of the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces, the Mission would also be charged with the task of undertaking investigations either on complaints from the parties or on its own, of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions relating to the agreement. In addition, the Mission would be called upon to provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons.

23. To ensure the effective conduct of the Mission's responsibilities, the Protocol calls for close cooperation and continuing consultations between the Force Commander, or his representative, the new Rwandese Defence Forces High Command Council and the "Conseil de Commandement de la Gendarmerie Nationale". This will be ensured through the holding of regular joint working sessions at all relevant command levels.

1. Concept of operations

24. The Mission would be based on the concept of operations described below.

25. Owing to the presence of several battalions of government forces in Kigali and the introduction into the city of the RPF leadership with a fully equipped RPF battalion, the Mission would establish a weapons secure area in and around Kigali. This zone would be defined as an area of approximately 10 kilometres in radius from the centre of Kigali within which the military units would be required to store their weapons and ammunition, except in those cases previously agreed to by all parties. The security of the city would be accomplished in four ways. First, the Mission would deploy an infantry battalion throughout the Kigali area with the aim of providing security for the international airport, the RPF battalion compound and government buildings and to assist in the recovery of arms from civilians. The battalion would require a wheeled armoured personnel carrier (APC) company for emergency deployment both in Kigali and in the expanded DMZ. Secondly, the Mission would monitor and verify the securing of weapons and the movement of all forces from both parties in the Kigali sector through the use of infantry and military observers. Thirdly, in monitoring the activities involved in the establishment of the new Integrated Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie, the Mission would deploy liaison officers to the headquarters of these new forces. Fourthly, the Mission would take appropriate

measures, as necessary, to assist in providing security for members of the transitional Government.

26. The Mission would monitor the cease-fire agreement through verification and control of the expanded DMZ and by the concentration, disarming, demobilization and integration of troops of both the parties and the Gendarmerie. This would be achieved by the deployment of military observers and a second infantry battalion (in addition to the two existing infantry platoons of NMOG II) in the DMZ and at the assembly points, cantonment points and integrated training centres. In accordance with the peace agreement, the responsibility for the identification of assembly zones, and thus the demarcation of the new DMZ, would rest with the Mission. A key task for the Force Commander would therefore be to confirm the proposed assembly zones, assembly points, cantonment points, integrated training centres and the demarcation of a new DMZ, in accordance with the agreement. From a total of 48 assembly and cantonment points and integrated training centres proposed by the two parties, the reconnaissance mission recommended that the number be reduced, subject to review by the Force Commander, to approximately 26 assembly and cantonment points and integrated training centres.

27. The reconnaissance mission conducted a survey of all armed forces in the country. The Rwandese Government declared it had an effective strength of 23,100 personnel deployed essentially in the northern part of the country and in the Kigali area. The RPF forces declared a strength of approximately 20,000 personnel concentrated north of the current DMZ. It was reported that the government Gendarmerie is made up of 6,000 personnel deployed essentially in the front lines. RPF does not have a gendarmerie. According to the Protocol, the process of demobilization of all of the forces and the Gendarmerie, and the subsequent training and integration of up to 13,000 personnel for the new National Army and 6,000 personnel for the new National Gendarmerie, is to be completed over a 7 to 9 month period. This process would commence on a date agreed to by the Mission and the transitional Government. The possible need to assist the parties with transporting their personnel, constructing shelters to accommodate the assembled troops and resupplying and/or feeding them would require special attention.

28. The approximately 35,000 (31,000 soldiers and 4,000 Gendarmerie) demobilized personnel who would not form part of the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie would benefit from vocational retraining and employment, in accordance with the Agreement, under the auspices of the Rwandese Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration and with the assistance of the United Nations programmes and agencies and NGOs.

29. The reconnaissance mission recommended that the Mission should have the capacity to provide escort and protection for humanitarian activities, as required, until relieved by the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie. It was also recommended that the Mission conduct essential force-related mine clearance. An overall mine-clearance programme is described in section III C below.

30. The effective execution of the Mission's tasks, as well as the rate at which they can proceed, depends not only upon the timely availability of resources, but also on the capacity of the local infrastructure (roads, fuel

supply, power supply, communications, warehousing space and personnel accommodation), as well as the Mission's repair and maintenance capabilities. Taking into account the state of the existing infrastructure in Rwanda, it would be essential for an engineer company to be deployed expeditiously to assist in restoring basic infrastructure, including roads and bridges necessary for the work of the Mission.

2. Proposed Force structure

31. The military observers of UNOMUR, established under Security Council resolution 846 (1993), would come under the command of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda, while maintaining their monitoring tasks on the Uganda/Rwanda border. The Mission would incorporate elements of the NMOG II forces already in place in the current DMZ (see annex I) under its command at the earliest opportunity.

32. The Mission's operations would be divided into five sectors. There would be a Kigali sector and a DMZ sector. Two other sectors would be located with the government forces and RPF forces respectively. UNOMUR would constitute the fifth sector. The Mission would be supported by engineer, aviation, communications and medical units, as well as by the necessary logistic and administrative staff. The Mission's Force headquarters would be located in Kigali.

33. A Military Observer Group headquarters would be responsible for command and control of the Military Observer Sectors and for administering all military observers in theatre. It would consist of a total of 20 military observers and would be comprised of the traditional branches of military staff.

34. The Government forces, RPF forces and UNOMUR Sectors would be composed entirely of United Nations military observers. These three Sectors, through their military observer teams, would be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the two parties. The military observer Sectors would be responsible for, inter alia, the following tasks: monitoring the observance by the two parties of modalities for the definite cessation of hostilities as provided for in the peace Agreement; monitoring the assembly zones and the preparation and maintenance of assembly and cantonment points; verifying the disengagement of forces, the movement of troops to assembly points and of heavy weapons to cantonment points; monitoring discipline of troops inside and outside assembly points; verifying inventories of weapons and ammunition of the two parties and monitoring operations for the separation of heavy weapons from light weapons; verifying the identification of military personnel in the assembly points; verifying the distribution of non-lethal supplies to troops in assembly points; monitoring the security of troops in the integrated training centres and monitoring the operations for the demobilization of servicemen and gendarmes.

35. The Kigali and the DMZ Sectors would each consist of an infantry battalion and military observers, who would perform tasks similar to those described in paragraph 34, as well as assist in arms recovery and verification through the use of checkpoints and patrols and in providing security at assembly and

cantonment points. The DMZ Sector would also take under its command the two NMOG II platoons currently serving in Rwanda.

36. The two infantry battalions (800 all ranks each) must be capable of supporting themselves for at least 60 days. They would each consist of a heavy logistics company and four rifle companies.

37. The Mission would also need an engineer company consisting of 203 personnel which would be responsible, inter alia, for supervising the rehabilitation and repair of basic infrastructure to meet the Mission's operational requirements and for undertaking essential demining tasks, including explosive ordnance disposal.

38. The Mission's support elements would consist of a helicopter unit of 40 personnel and 4 utility helicopters and a light twin-engine aircraft, a movement control section of 20 personnel, a logistics company of 200 personnel and a medical platoon of 50 personnel.

3. Deployment schedule

39. The military personnel of the Mission would be deployed progressively as shown in Annex II and would conduct the operation in four phases.

40. Phase 1 would commence on the day on which the Security Council adopts the enabling resolution and would end on D-Day, the day on which the transitional Government is installed in Kigali. Given the time required to establish and deploy the proposed Mission, it is estimated that the transitional Government may not be installed until the end of 1993. The objective of this phase would be to establish the essential conditions needed to permit the secure installation of the transitional Government. The necessary command and control, service support, infrastructure and equipment would be put in place. This would require the immediate deployment of the military planning staff of the Mission headquarters (including approximately 25 military, 3 civilian police and 18 civilians). This phase would also see elements of the expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR observers continuing their respective mandates in the DMZ and on the Uganda-Rwanda border, but under command of the Mission. By the end of phase 1, the strength of the Mission would number a total of 1,428 military personnel, of whom 1,217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 211 would be military observers (including 77 military observers from UNOMUR and 54 from NMOG II).

41. Phase 2 would commence on D-Day and last until D-Day+90 or when the process of disengagement, demobilization and integration of the Forces and Gendarmerie begins. This phase would see the continued build up of the Mission to its peak strength. The expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR would be fully integrated as entities into the Mission and would continue to discharge their mandates. The major activities during this phase would be to continue monitoring the DMZ and the Uganda-Rwanda border and assisting in providing security in Kigali, the demarcation of the assembly zones, monitoring the modification of the DMZ and ensuring that all preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration process are in place. While the agreement did not specify a date for the start of the demobilization process, it did estimate that one month would be required to set up the support elements needed to conduct this

operation. However, the reconnaissance mission's estimate is that two to three months would be required to ensure that the infrastructure needed for demobilization is in place. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would include a total of 2,548 military personnel, of whom 2,217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 331 would be military observers.

42. Phase 3 would commence on D-Day+90, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process begins, and would last until D-Day+360, or when the process is completed. During this phase, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor the new DMZ with a second infantry battalion, and would continue to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border. It would establish approximately 26 assembly/cantonment points and integrated training centres, monitor the movement of large bodies of military personnel in and through the DMZ and assist in maintaining general security in the country. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would be in the process of reduction to approximately 1,240 all ranks.

43. Phase 4 would commence on D-Day+360, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process is completed. This phase would last about 10 months. It would see the further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level needed to assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections. During this phase, the monitoring of the DMZ and of the Uganda-Rwanda border would cease. The residual strength of the Mission would amount to approximately 930 military personnel, of whom 850 would be staff officers and formed troops and 80 would be military observers.

B. Civilian police

44. The Arusha peace agreement calls on the United Nations to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and Communal Police.

45. The law and order situation during the transitional phase would be dependent on several internal security considerations: possible political and ethnic tensions; the potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry after the demobilization of the forces of the parties; the easy availability of weapons; the possible disruption of the humanitarian aid effort; and the inability of local agencies to cope effectively with rising crime in the country, particularly in Kigali.

46. In accordance with the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie would be reduced from a strength of approximately 6,000 to a strength of 1,800 during the demobilization phase. All members of the Gendarmerie would be screened, along with RPF candidates, for positions in the new Gendarmerie or for complete demobilization into the community. The Gendarmerie would subsequently be reconstituted with a maximum force level of 6,000 all ranks.

47. In order to verify that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, a small United Nations civilian police unit, headed by a Police

Commissioner, would be deployed in Kigali and the nine prefecture capitals and in specific police installations. It is estimated that a total of 60 police officers would be required. The police unit would consist of a headquarters of 10 officers, including a special investigation team; a Kigali district consisting of 20 personnel; and a provincial district consisting of monitoring teams for each of the prefectures (except Kigali), requiring a total of 30 personnel.

C. Humanitarian assistance

48. In addition to the provisions of the Protocol on Refugees and Displaced Persons, both the Government and RPF have indicated that international assistance will be essential in bringing about the successful implementation of the peace agreement. Humanitarian agencies will continue to provide assistance based on the principle of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

49. By March 1993, a total of 900,000 people, or approximately 13 per cent of the nation's population, had been displaced. The Secretary-General launched a consolidated appeal in April 1993 to meet the emergency needs of these displaced people. The international community has made cash and in-kind contributions of up to US$ 100 million since January 1993. With the signing of the peace agreement, it is estimated that some 600,000 individuals have already returned to their homes. With their return, the emergency situation that arose earlier in the year has eased. For the estimated 300,000 people who remain displaced and continue to rely on emergency assistance in the camps, such assistance will continue to be provided.

50. If a United Nations operation is deployed in Rwanda, humanitarian assistance would need to be coordinated with the Mission's activities. Currently, the United Nations Resident Coordinator ensures coordination among United Nations agencies, and with the donor community and NGOs. He will continue to do so during the transitional period.

51. As a result of the decision of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in February 1993 on its programme for Rwanda, UNDP and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs will hold a Round-table Meeting on humanitarian assistance, which will include aspects of demobilization and reconstruction, in early 1994. In addition to local fund-raising efforts, the meeting will provide an excellent opportunity to solicit support from a larger number of donors and to inform them of the latest situation in the country. I hope that the donor community will continue to respond favourably to the financial needs in the humanitarian sector.

52. Regarding assistance to demobilized soldiers, a comprehensive programme catering to their needs is being studied using previous United Nations peace-keeping experience in other regions. The United Nations is encouraging the donor community to examine the possibility of pooling resources for the preparation and implementation of such a programme.

53. Finally, regarding the Rwandese who have taken refuge in neighbouring countries, the starting point of the implementation of the activities envisaged for the repatriation and reintegration of the returnees is the establishment of

the transitional Government. UNHCR has been coordinating refugee activities and has been making advance preparations in the countries of asylum. The return of refugees will be regulated through tripartite agreements among country of origin, country of asylum and UNHCR. The establishment of national committees for repatriation and local integration is also foreseen, as is the establishment of a Commission for Repatriation under the transitional Government.

54. It has been recommended that an information campaign be launched both in the countries of asylum and in Rwanda to promote the provisions of the peace agreement. Information relating to refugees and the options offered to them (repatriation, naturalization or to remain as aliens), should also be part of this information campaign.

55. Mine-clearance has been earmarked as a priority to ease the constant threat to the lives of the displaced persons. It has also been pointed out that, with their removal, a more direct access by humanitarian agencies to areas needing assistance would be possible. This requirement is specifically addressed in article 40 of the Protocol on Refugees and Displaced Persons.

56. It has been estimated that a mine-clearance programme would be confined to a small area of the northern part of the country. The most serious mine problem however, would be the location and detection of mines in tea and banana plantations, as well as on open grassland and on tracks. At present, land mines already pose a serious threat to the local population. This threat will continue to increase as displaced persons return to their villages.

57. The reconnaissance mission recommended that the United Nations initiate a mine-clearance programme, including a survey of existing locations, a mine-awareness campaign for displaced persons and refugees and a training programme in mine deactivation for the government and RPF engineer forces. An engineer element should be included within the military component to provide a local mine-clearance capability on routes necessary to the Mission's operations. In addition, should the training programme for both parties be deemed unworkable or unsafe, a professional mine-clearance company would be subcontracted as has been the practice in other peace-keeping missions.

58. There will be a need to continue substantial humanitarian assistance activities in the future. The United Nations Resident Coordinator will continue to serve as the coordinator for these activities, working in close cooperation with all relevant organizations of the United Nations system. It is anticipated that a capacity would be established in the Mission for liaison and coordination with the humanitarian assistance programme, in particular with respect to adequate security as may be necessary for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and the process of demobilization and reintegration of armed forces into society.

D. Administrative aspects

59. The Mission would require an administrative component based in Kigali, with two regional offices. One regional office would be located in the northern city of Byumba. The second would be in Kabale, which is the present headquarters of UNOMUR. The administrative component would provide necessary support in areas

of personnel, finance, procurement, communications, travel, compensation, translation and interpretation, electronic data processing, etc. In order to provide information to the general public on the activities of the mission, the Mission would seek access to an established radio station.

60. It is estimated that a total of 127 international staff (26 Professional and 101 Field and General Service staff) and 68 locally recruited staff would be required. These figures include the 17 international staff and 7 locally recruited staff currently working in Uganda with UNOMUR. The 26 Professional staff would include 4 political officers, 2 public information officers, 1 human rights officer and humanitarian assistance officers.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

61. In my report of 24 August (S/26350), I stated that the signing of the Arusha peace agreement had provided the Government of Rwanda and RPF with a political and democratic framework for resolving their conflict. The agreement gives the international community an opportunity to contribute to the successful implementation of the peace process. In this connection, I should like to acknowledge, with deep gratitude, the continuing efforts of the Facilitator, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Mwinyi, and of the Secretary-General of OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, to encourage the parties to abide by the commitments they freely entered into when they concluded the Arusha agreement.

62. The Rwandese people face extensive hardship and a critical economic situation. There is a strong grass-roots desire to see an end to the destruction and suffering brought about by a protracted conflict. Both sides seem determined to achieve a durable peace through disarmament, demobilization and national reconciliation. At the same time, there is serious concern over the possibility that any inordinate delay in establishing the transitional Government may endanger the peace process. These concerns have been expressed to my reconnaissance mission by the leadership of both sides, the resident diplomatic community in Rwanda, NGOs and, especially, the Secretary General of OAU. I therefore consider that the United Nations should respond positively to the appeal of the parties for assistance in the implementation of the peace agreement, especially since the mandate of the OAU NMOG II force will terminate by 31 October 1993.

63. The proposed United Nations Mission in Rwanda should be deployed without delay following Security Council authorization in order to allow for the prompt establishment of the transitional institutions. The immediate deployment of an advance party, including the Force Commander, would underscore the determination of the United Nations for the rapid build-up of the military presence needed in Kigali and of the logistic base for deployment of the force. The subsequent introduction of observers and formed units would enable the force to contribute to the implementation of the disengagement, demobilization and integration phase, while providing an adequate level of security and a credible United Nations presence. Finally, the reduction of the military and civilian police components should ensure that the operation is carried out in a cost-effective manner while contributing, at the same time, to the maintenance of the stability required for the period culminating with the elections.

64. The UNOMUR observers currently deployed on the Uganda side of the Uganda-Rwanda border remain a necessary stabilizing factor. It is therefore considered that UNOMOR must continue to monitor that border until the end of the demobilization process. However, UNOMOR's chain of command and future logistics would be integrated into the proposed Mission.

65. I am encouraged by the restraint and desire for a lasting peace and national reconciliation shown by the parties since the signature of the Arusha peace agreement. They have demonstrated their goodwill by holding a number of joint informal working groups and by the support they provided to the reconnaissance mission in all of its fact-finding activities. The two parties also sent a joint delegation to the United Nations, which I met on 15 September. The joint delegation stressed to me the urgency of the establishment of a United Nations force, since the successful implementation of the Arusha agreement was predicated on its deployment. The delegation emphasized that, unless immediate action was taken to deploy the force, the implementation of the peace agreement would be seriously compromised as a result of the vacuum that would be created. I explained to the joint delegation that the decision regarding the establishment of such a force rested with the Security Council and that, even with the approval of the Council, it could take up to three months for such a force to be fully deployed. Under the circumstances, I urged the parties, in the interim, to respect the commitments they had undertaken in Arusha to work together for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country and to strictly adhere to the cease-fire.

66. In the light of the above, I recommend that the Security Council authorize the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to be known as UNAMIR, with the mandate of contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government. This operation would be deployed according to the schedule described in section III of the present report.

67. I further recommend that the Security Council urge Member States to support the current United Nations aid effort in Rwanda. UNAMIR and the United Nations Resident Coordinator would closely coordinate their respective activities in this regard.

68. Should the Security Council authorize the establishment of UNAMIR, it would be my intention to appoint a Special Representative who would lead the Mission in the field and exercise authority over all its elements. The military component of the Mission would be headed by a Force Commander. The Mission would operate under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. I would report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of UNAMIR. All matters that might affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Mission would be referred to the Security Council for its decision.

69. In accordance with established practice, UNAMIR would need to have freedom of movement, communications and inspection and to enjoy the other rights that would be necessary for the performance of its tasks in Rwanda. UNAMIR and its personnel would also have to be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Should the Security Council decide to establish UNAMIR, it would be my

intention to initiate consultations with the transitional Government with a view to promptly concluding a status-of-forces agreement along the usual lines.

70. In conclusion, I wish to stress that two essential conditions must be met to enable the United Nations to carry out its recommended role in Rwanda successfully and effectively. First, the parties must cooperate fully with one another and the United Nations in carrying out their commitments under the Arusha agreement. Secondly, the United Nations must be provided in a timely manner with the necessary human and financial resources. At a time of unprecedented financial constraints facing the United Nations, it is imperative that Member States be prepared to assume the obligations resulting from the new mandates they entrust to the Organization.

Annex I
Current demilitarized zone

MAP NO. 3807.1 UNITED NATIONS
SEPTEMBER 1993

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Annex II

Deployment schedule and strengths by month - military component

	PHASE 1 Preparatory			PHASE 2 Broad-based Transitional Government			PHASE 3 Demobilization/integration									PHASE 4 Electoral										
MONTH	10. 93	11. 93	12. 93	1. 94	2. 94	3. 94	4. 94	5. 94	6. 94	7. 94	8. 94	9. 94	10. 94	11. 94	12. 94	1. 95	2. 95	3. 95	4. 95	5. 95	6. 95	7. 95	8. 95	9. 95	10. 95	11. 95
	M-DAY		D-	DAY																					E-DAY	
FORCE HQ	43	54													40										30	0
KIGALI SECTOR HQ	15												0													0
KIGALI INF BN		300	800																						675	0
KIGALI UNMOS	15	78				42							0													0
DMZ SECTOR HQ	18					15								0												0
DMZ INF BN					500	800								700	300											0
DMZ PL	60													0												0
DMZ UNMOS	36					18								0												0
UNMO GROUP HQ	20														80										80	0
UNOMUR SECTOR	77														0											0
RPF SECTOR				66		87							51	15	0											0
GOVT. SECTOR				51		87							51	15	0											0
ENGR COY		100		203						88			0													0
LOG COY		100		200										89	0											0
MED PL		50													0											0
MOV CTL	20															10									10	0
TOTAL	304 a/	928	1 428	1 748	2 248	2 548				2 433			2 216	1 840	1 240	930									795	0

a/ Of total, 191 are already in Rwanda and Uganda with NMOG II and UNOMUR.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26488/Add.1
29 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RWANDA

Addendum

1. In my report of 24 September 1993 to the Security Council (S/26488), I recommended, in paragraph 66, that the Council authorize the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to be known as UNAMIR, with the mandate of contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of a transitional Government in Rwanda. This operation would be deployed according to the schedule described in section III, paragraphs 39 to 43, of my main report.

2. Based on the operational plan and general assumptions outlined in my main report, it is estimated that an amount of $62.6 million would be required for a period of six months. This amount includes the costs of start-up and acquisition of capital equipment. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

3. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that, should the Security Council agree to the establishment and deployment of UNAMIR, the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a special account to be established for that purpose.

Annex

Cost estimates by objects of expenditure

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Objects of expenditure		Initial six months
1.	Military component	
	(a) Observers	4 682
	(b) Contingent personnel	13 147
	(c) Other costs pertaining to contingents	1 536
2.	Civilian police	851
3.	Civilian staff costs a/	6 956
4.	Premises/accommodation	2 700
5.	Infrastructure repairs	1 036
6.	Transport operations	8 958
7.	Air operations	2 530
8.	Communications	2 998
9.	Miscellaneous equipment	6 868
10.	Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	7 844
11.	Mine-clearing programme	510
12.	Programme related to former combatants in the assembly areas	2 002
	Total	62 618

a/ Provides for 127 international staff and 68 locally recruited staff.

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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S/26489
27 September 1993

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 15 (c)
ELECTIONS TO FILL VACANCIES IN PRINCIPAL ORGANS: ELECTION OF FIVE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Memorandum by the Secretary-General

CONTENTS

		Paragraphs	Page
I.	INTRODUCTION	1 - 2	2
II.	COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE	3	2
III.	PROCEDURE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL	4 - 18	3

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 5 February 1994, the terms of office of the following five members of the International Court of Justice will expire:

Mr. Shigeru Oda (Japan)
Mr. Ni Zhengyu (China)
Mr. Jens Evensen (Norway)
Mr. Bola A. Ajibola (Nigeria)
Mr. Géza Herczegh (Hungary)

It is therefore necessary for the General Assembly and the Security Council, during the forty-eighth session of the Assembly, to elect five judges for a term of office of nine years, beginning on 6 February 1994.

2. The Secretary-General requested nominations from the national groups of States parties to the Statute of the Court by 31 August 1993. The nominations received by that date and the curricula vitae of the candidates are contained in separate documents submitted to the General Assembly and to the Security Council (A/48/433-S/26490 and A/48/440-S/26497). Furthermore, the list of candidates will appear on the ballot papers distributed during the elections. The object of this memorandum is to set out the present composition of the International Court of Justice and to describe the procedure in the Assembly and the Security Council with regard to the election.

II. COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

3. The present composition of the International Court of Justice is as follows:

President: Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)***

Vice President: Shigeru Oda (Japan)*

Judges: Roberto Ago (Italy)**
Stephen M. Schwebel (United States of America)**
Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algeria)**
Ni Zhengyu (China)*
Jens Evensen (Norway)*
Nikolai K. Tarassov (Russian Federation)**
Gilbert Guillaume (France)***
Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana)**
Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley (Venezuela)***
Christopher G. Weeramantry (Sri Lanka)***
Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar)***

Bola A. Ajibola (Nigeria)*
Géza Herczegh (Hungary)*

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* Term of office expires on 5 February 1994.

** Term of office expires on 5 February 1997.

*** Term of office expires on 5 February 2000.

III. PROCEDURE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

4. The election will take place in accordance with the following:

(a) The Statute of the Court, in particular Articles 2 to 4 and 7 to 12;

(b) Rules 150 and 151 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly;

(c) Rules 40 and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

5. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 264 (III) of 8 October 1948, Nauru and Switzerland, which are parties to the Statute of the Court, but not Members of the United Nations, will participate in the General Assembly in electing members of the Court in the same manner as the States Members of the United Nations.

6. On the date of the election, the General Assembly and the Security Council will proceed, independently of one another, to elect five members of the Court to fill the vacancy (Article 8 of the Statute).

7. According to Article 2 of the Statute, judges are to be elected, regardless of their nationality, from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law. Article 9 requires electors to bear in mind not only that the person to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that, in the body as a whole, the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.

8. Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council will be considered as elected (Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Statute).

9. The consistent practice of the United Nations has been to interpret the words "absolute majority" as meaning a majority of all electors whether or not they vote or are allowed to vote. The electors in the General Assembly are all the Member States (184), together with the two non-member States, mentioned in paragraph 5 above, which are parties to the Statute of the Court. Accordingly,

94 votes constitute an absolute majority in the Assembly for the purpose of the present Court election.

10. In the Security Council, eight votes constitute an absolute majority and no distinction is made between permanent and non-permanent members of the Council (Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Statute).

11. Only those candidates whose names appear on the ballot papers are eligible for election. The electors in the General Assembly and in the Security Council will indicate the candidates for whom they wish to vote by placing crosses against their names on the ballot papers. Each elector may vote for not more than five candidates on the first ballot and, on subsequent ballots, if any, for five less the number of candidates who have already obtained absolute majorities.

12. At the 915th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on 16 November 1960, a procedural discussion took place as to whether rule 94 (then rule 96) of the rules of procedure of the Assembly should be applied in elections to the International Court of Justice. That rule lays down a procedure for restricted ballots in the event that, after the first ballot, the requisite number of candidates have not obtained the required majority. By 47 votes to 27, with 25 abstentions, the Assembly decided that the rule did not apply to elections to the Court and it proceeded to elect the requisite number of candidates by a series of unrestricted ballots. This decision has been followed consistently.

13. If, in the first ballot in either the General Assembly or the Security Council, the number of candidates obtaining an absolute majority is less than five, a second ballot will be held and balloting will continue in the same meeting until five candidates have obtained the required majority (rule 151 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly and rule 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council).

14. Cases have arisen in the Security Council in which more than the required number of candidates have obtained an absolute majority on the same ballot. The practice followed by the Council has been to hold a new vote on all the candidates, and the President of the Council made no notification to the President of the General Assembly until only the required number of candidates, and no more, had obtained an absolute majority in the Council.

15. Only when five candidates have obtained the required majority in one of the organs will the President of that organ notify the President of the other organ of the names of the five candidates. The President of the latter should not communicate such names to the members of that organ until that organ has itself given five candidates the required majority of votes.

16. If, upon comparison of the respective lists of names that have obtained an absolute majority in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, fewer than five candidates have been thus elected pursuant to paragraph 8 above, the Assembly and the Council will proceed, again independently of one another, in a second meeting and, if necessary, a third meeting, to elect candidates by further ballots for seats remaining vacant (Article 11 of the Statute), the results again being compared after the required number of candidates have obtained an absolute majority in each organ.

17. If, however, after the third meeting, one or more seats still remain unfilled, the General Assembly and the Security Council may at any time, at the request of either organ, form a joint conference consisting of six members, three appointed by each organ. This joint conference may, by an absolute majority, agree upon one name for each seat still vacant and submit the name or names for the respective acceptance of the Assembly and the Council. If the joint conference is unanimously agreed, it may submit the name of a person not included in the list of nominations, provided that that candidate fulfils the required conditions (Article 12, paragraph 2 of the Statute).

18. If the joint conference is satisfied that it will not be successful in procuring an election, those members of the Court who have already been elected will, within a period to be fixed by the Security Council, proceed to fill the vacant seat or seats by selection from among those candidates who have obtained votes either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. In the event of an equality of votes among the judges, the eldest judge will have a casting vote (Article 12, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Statute).

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NATIONS

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27 September 1993

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 15 (c)
ELECTIONS TO FILL VACANCIES IN
PRINCIPAL ORGANS: ELECTION OF
FIVE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

List of candidates nominated by national groups

Note by the Secretary-General

1. By a communication dated 2 March 1993, addressed on behalf of the Secretary-General to States parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, attention was drawn to the fact that the terms of office of the following five members of the International Court of Justice will expire on 5 February 1994:

Mr. Shigeru Oda (Japan)
Mr. Ni Zhengyu (China)
Mr. Jens Evensen (Norway)
Mr. Bola A. Ajibola (Nigeria)
Mr. Géza Herczegh (Hungary)

2. In conformity with Articles 4 and 13 of the Statute of the Court, the General Assembly and the Security Council, during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, will elect five judges for a period of nine years, beginning on 6 February 1994. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Statute of the Court, national groups were thus invited to undertake the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court and to submit such nomination to the Secretary-General no later than 31 August 1993.

3. In accordance with Article 7 of the Statute of the Court, the Secretary-General has the honour to submit to the General Assembly and to the Security Council a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus nominated (see annex).

4. The composition of the Court and the voting procedure to be followed in the General Assembly and in the Security Council will be set out in a memorandum by the Secretary-General, issued as document A/48/432-S/26489. The curricula vitae of the candidates will appear in document A/48/440-S/26497.

ANNEX

List of candidates nominated by national groups

Name and nationality	Nominated by the national group of
Adede, Andronico O. (Kenya)	Kenya Netherlands
Ajibola, Bola A. (Nigeria)	Belgium Ecuador Nigeria Sweden
Asante, Samuel K. B. (Ghana)	Colombia Ecuador Ghana Ireland Singapore Sri Lanka
Chongwe, Rodger (Zambia)	Zambia
Fleischhauer, Carl-August (Germany)	Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Bolivia Brazil Canada Colombia Denmark France Germany Guatemala Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Liechtenstein Luxembourg Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Poland Sierra Leone Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland

Name and nationality	Nominated by the national group of
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
	United States of America
	Uruguay
Herczegh, Géza (Hungary)	Brazil
	Canada
	Denmark
	France
	Hungary
	Ireland
	Italy
	Liechtenstein
	Luxembourg
	Netherlands
	Sweden
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
	Uruguay
Hayder, Nasrat Munla (Syrian Arab Republic)	Syrian Arab Republic
Jesus, José Luis (Cape Verde)	Argentina
	Bolivia
	Brazil
	Cape Verde
	Greece
	Liechtenstein
	Portugal
	Spain
	Switzerland
Koroma, Abdul G. (Sierra Leone)	Russian Federation
	Sierra Leone
Lejmi, Mohamed (Tunisia)	Tunisia
Oda, Shigeru (Japan)	Argentina
	Australia
	Belgium
	Bolivia
	Brazil
	Bulgaria
	Canada
	Chile
	Colombia
	Denmark
	Dominican Republic

Name and nationality	Nominated by the national group of
	Ecuador
	El Salvador
	Germany
	Ghana
	Greece
	Guatemala
	Hungary
	Iceland
	Ireland
	Italy
	Japan
	Liechtenstein
	Luxembourg
	Nepal
	Netherlands
	New Zealand
	Nicaragua
	Pakistan
	Panama
	Paraguay
	Peru
	Poland
	Romania
	Russian Federation
	Sierra Leone
	Singapore
	Spain
	Sri Lanka
	Sweden
	Switzerland
	Thailand
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
	United Republic of Tanzania
	United States of America
	Uruguay
	Venezuela
Shi, Jiuyong (China)	Argentina
	Australia
	Bolivia
	Chile
	China
	Denmark
	Greece
	Hungary
	Iceland
	Italy
	Luxembourg
	Nepal
	New Zealand

Name and nationality	Nominated by the national group of
	Pakistan Poland Romania Russian Federation Sierra Leone Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Thailand United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States of America Uruguay
Skubiszewski, Krzysztof (Poland)	Belgium Poland
Ssekandi, Francis M. (Uganda)	Uganda
Syquia, Enrique P. (Philippines)	Philippines
Vassylenko, Volodymyr A. (Ukraine)	Ukraine
Yankov, Alexander (Bulgaria)	Bulgaria

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/26491
24 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to submit herewith a letter dated 24 September 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Mate Granic, addressed to you.

I would be grateful if you would provide for the distribution of this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 24 September 1993 from the Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am addressing you at this critical moment when decisions on the future of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia are to be made, in order to inform the Security Council about the actual position of the Croatian Parliament and the Croatian Government with regard to the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 September 1993 (S/26470).

We appreciate the contribution of the Security Council, the United Nations Secretariat and UNPROFOR personnel in peace-keeping efforts on the territory of Croatia. Croatia deeply regrets the losses that the international forces have suffered, and is grateful for their devoted humanitarian effort that benefited citizens of Croatia.

On 23 September 1993 the House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament considered with utmost care the Secretary-General's aforementioned report, and decided that Croatia cannot accept prolongation of the UNPROFOR mandate on its territory under present circumstances. The Parliament gave its full support to the Government and the President of Croatia regarding their decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia in its present form. Croatia cannot accept any prolongation of the "peace-keeping" operation that is in fact not keeping peace but preserving the status quo, which is seriously undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia.

The major changes in the UNPROFOR mandate that Croatia desires are based upon existing Security Council resolutions and reports of the Secretary-General. Croatia wants nothing more, but can accept nothing less, than is already inscribed in the Secretary-General's reports, particularly in documents S/23280, annex III, also known as the Vance plan and in Security Council resolutions 724 (1991), 762 (1992), 779 (1992), 802 (1993), 807 (1993), 815 (1993), 820 (1993) and 847 (1993).

The Croatian Parliament and Government welcome the Secretary-General's readiness to "take steps to implement such a division" [of UNPROFOR] (S/26470, para. 13), as proposed in the letter by the President of the Republic of Croatia dated 13 September 1993. But at the same time the willingness of the Secretariat to grant Croatia's proposal to separate the UNPROFOR mandate into three independent operations is not sufficient in itself. On the contrary it must be followed by concrete steps mentioned in the four following points, and with strong confidence-building measures such as the reopening of major communication, roads and routes, energy systems and other facilities throughout the United Nations protected areas.

With regard to the aforementioned, the Croatian Parliament and Government insist upon the following measures which should be regarded as an essential part of the future of UNPROFOR's presence on the territory of Croatia.

1. All of the military and police units of Serbian insurgents which are operating in the United Nations protected areas and pink zones must be "disbanded and demobilized [and] the personnel involved must cease to wear any uniforms and cease to carry weapons" (S/23280, annex III, para. 15). This is the pillar of the Vance plan and in our view the most important step towards peace. UNPROFOR completely failed to fulfil this task and that failure resulted in the continuation of military activities by Serbian insurgents including deliberate shelling of Croatian cities and other civilian targets. The Croatian Government fully shares the view expressed by the Secretary-General that "the first objective of UNPROFOR is to achieve demilitarization and the disbanding of paramilitary and irregular forces" (S/24188, para. 14), but at the same time must express its grave dismay that nothing in this regard has been achieved thus far.

The only armed force in the United Nations protected areas besides UNPROFOR, should be the local police units, carrying only side arms and which "in composition reflects the national composition of the population which lived in the area concerned before the recent hostilities" (S/23592, para. 17 (b)). All of the arms currently used by Serbian insurgents must be destroyed or handed over to the United Nations force for safe custody.

2. Croatia must be allowed to immediately restore its governmental authority in the entire area of the so-called "pink zones". We are prepared to begin "an internationally monitored, step-by-step, reintroduction of Croatian Government authority in such a manner as to minimize the danger of further hostilities and any further destabilization of the adjoining regions (S/24188, para. 17). Unfortunately the UNPROFOR operation never achieved this goal. Croatia wishes to emphasize the fact that the "pink zones" have never, in any way, been a part of the United Nations protected areas.

Croatia insists upon the full implementation of the Secretary-General's report (S/24188) in particular the part which emphasizes that in the pink zones, "UNCIVPOL would supervise the restoration of authority by Croatian police and the re-establishment of the local police in proportion to the demographic structure of the areas prior to the conflict" (para. 16 (d)).

3. The process of the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes must finally begin. The Vance plan clearly states that "in accordance with internationally established principles the United Nations policy is to facilitate the return to their homes of all persons displaced by the recent hostilities who so desire" (S/23280, annex III, para. 20). The Croatian Government must stress with great disappointment that, contrary to the aforementioned principle, tens of thousands of refugees from the United Nations protected areas have not yet been able to return to their homes. On the contrary, the process of ethnic cleansing in the United Nations protected areas and "pink zones" has been completed in the presence of peace-keeping forces, with thousands more refugees expelled and hundreds of people killed. The Secretary-General, in his report of 28 September 1992, stated that "the frustration at this state of affairs expressed by the Government of Croatia and the refugees themselves is entirely understandable" (S/24600, para. 35).

Exactly one year later the situation remains very much the same, if not worse.

4. The international borders of Croatia that form the boundary of the United Nations protected areas must be put under efficient international control, thus preventing Serbian insurgents from violating them by moving weapons, ammunition, military equipment and manpower. In spite of the hostile actions by Serbian insurgents and their refusal to let UNPROFOR take control of the borders, it is the strong opinion of the Croatian Government that resolution 769 (1992) must be fully implemented. UNPROFOR "should have powers to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders where these coincide with the international frontiers [in the Republic of Croatia]" (S/24353, para. 28).

Croatia considers the full protection of human rights and minority rights, in particular of the Serbian population in the United Nations protected areas, to be of utmost importance for the overall political solution. Therefore, we firmly guarantee those rights as inscribed in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and the Constitutional Law on the Rights of Minorities and Ethnic Communities, as well as the Amnesty and Abolition Laws. I wish to emphasize that Croatia wants to implement these norms as soon as possible, and invites international monitors, such as those envisaged by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Council of Europe.

The Croatian Parliament and Government are fully aware of all the possible consequences and responsibilities which could result from the cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate on the territory of Croatia. However, we are left with no options but to request the guarantees that, by the end of the year, the provisions in essential documents be fully implemented, including the provisions set forth in document S/23280, annex III, paragraph 15, adopted by Security Council resolution 724 (1991) on 14 December 1991; the provisions set forth in document S/24188, paragraph 17 adopted by Security Council resolution 762 (1992) on 27 July 1992; the provisions set forth in document S/23280, annex III, paragraph 20 adopted by Security Council resolution 724 (1991); and the provisions set forth in document S/24353, paragraph 28 adopted by Security Council resolution 769 (1992) on 7 August 1992.

Considering the above, the Croatian Parliament and Government deeply regret that, if the aforesaid guarantees are not incorporated into the resolution concerning the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate, upon the expiration of the present interim extension, it shall consider the mandate, for the territory of Croatia terminated.

If the above guarantees are not included in the operative part of the resolution, Croatia hereby requests the withdrawal of all the UNPROFOR contingents by 30 November 1993.

However, if the above guarantees are incorporated in the operative part of the resolution renewing the mandate of UNPROFOR for the territory of Croatia, my Government will welcome the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate for the term suggested in the Secretary-General's report (S/26470, para. 16).

It has to be emphasized once again that Croatia does not oppose the UNPROFOR operation on its territory - it opposes UNPROFOR's inefficiency. Therefore, we have advocated, and continue to support the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the implementation of the peace plan for Croatia.

In the light of the tragic humanitarian situation in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia is willing to allow a limited civilian affairs operation in Croatia's coastal regions for the purpose of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian people. Furthermore, continued unrestricted access will be provided to all the humanitarian agencies operating in Croatia, as well as the use of Croatian ports and transportation routes for the possible peace mission of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Signed) Mate GRANIC
Vice-President and Minister for
Foreign Affairs

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26492
24 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency the "Peace Plan of the Republic of Angola" with the request that this document be circulated as a document of the United Nations Security Council.

(Signed) Afonso VAN-DUNEM "MBINDA"
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement

According to news being circulated by UNITA and some international press agencies, an Angolan government delegation, made up of officers of the Angolan Armed Forces, went to Sao Tome and Principe to meet the UNITA military delegation, headed by its Chief of Staff, General Arlindo Chenda Pena Ben-Ben.

Furthermore, other reports, which UNITA is spreading for propaganda purposes, indicate that a cease-fire went into effect on 20 September throughout the territory of Angola.

Quite the contrary, UNITA has stepped up and intensified its military operations on all fronts throughout the country, in a desperate effort to expand and consolidate its positions.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations wishes to deny these reports categorically and also to denounce these allegations before international public opinion, for their sole purpose is to prevent the entry into force of the sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 15 September 1993 in its resolution 864 (1993); which sanctions, as is well known, are scheduled to be applied as of 25 September 1993.

The Mission of Angola to the United Nations wishes furthermore to make public the peace plan of the Angolan Government, the English text of which reads as follows:

PEACE PLAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

The desire for stability and peace in the Republic of Angola is an immediate necessity demanded by all Angolans.

This was the objective of the Bicesse Accords in which the Angolan people and the international community joined their efforts. These accords resulted in the holding of free and fair multi-party elections, and, consequently, the establishment of a new constitutional framework, recognized and accepted by all Member countries of the United Nations.

Taking into account the fact that UNITA's leader has consistently assumed a position that is not serious and has defied, not only the Angolan people, but also the demands of the international community as stated in the relevant United Nations resolutions on Angola, namely, resolutions 804/93, 811/93, 823/93, 834/93 and 851/93, the Angolan Government considers that the foundation for the resolution of the post-electoral crisis unleashed by UNITA should be based on the following principles:

1. UNITA military forces should be withdrawn from territories that were illegally occupied after the multi-party elections held on September 29-30, 1992. This action should be followed by a cease-fire under the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

2. The unimpeded access for humanitarian aid and immediate evacuation of the wounded, ill, and foreigners after the cease-fire, must take place.

3. Complete and unequivocal acceptance of the validity of the Bicesse Accords, and the results of the elections held in September 1992.

4. Respect for the legislation produced by the instruments of sovereignty instituted as a result of the elections.

5. The Angolan Government reiterates its willingness to resume negotiations once the conditions for these negotiations have been established.

Luanda, 22 September 1993

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NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26493
26 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a statement by the Press Office of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic issued on 23 September 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar T. ALIYEV
Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement issued on 23 September 1993 by the Press Office of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic

In recent days there have been positive developments in the search for a peaceful settlement of the inter-State Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Despite the efforts undertaken to this end by the Azerbaijani leaders, however, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia are continuing their aggression against Azerbaijan.

In the course of 14 and 15 September, settlements in Kazakh district and the district centre, the town of Kazakh, were shelled from the territory of Armenia. As a result, civilians were killed and wounded and many buildings were destroyed.

On 16 September, the Armenian side, having stepped up its offensive along the entire State frontier, attempted to breach positions of the Azerbaijani army in Tauz and Kedabek districts and in the Sadarak district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

On 17 September, villages in Zangelan and Kubatly districts, as well as the district centre Sadarak, were shelled from the territory of Armenia.

On 21 September, villages in Tauz district and in the Ordubad district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic came under fire from various types of weapons.

In conformity with the cease-fire agreement, the sub-units of the national army of Azerbaijan took no retaliatory action in any of the above-mentioned incidents.

Over the last few days, there has been a build-up of fighting equipment and troop units of the Republic of Armenia in the area adjacent to Kazakh district, affording further confirmation of the aggressive intensions of the Armenian side.

All the facts adduced above constitute flagrant violations of international law and demonstrate that the constant breaching of understandings, the wilful escalation of the conflict and the exacerbation of tension in the region are all interrelated elements of a deliberate policy pursued by the Erevan authorities, who have no interest in reaching a peaceful settlement to this protracted military conflict.

In the light of the foregoing, the leaders of the Azerbaijani Republic once again appeal to the international community, and above all to the States members of the Security Council of the United Nations, to ensure that Armenia takes a

fully responsible approach to the problem of finding a peaceful settlement to the conflict and that it complies forthwith with Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993).

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A/48/437
S/26494
24 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda items 34 and 35
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
QUESTION OF PALESTINE

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 22 September 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement issued on 10 September 1993 by the Government of Thailand on the agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel on limited autonomy in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 35, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nitya PIBULSONGGRAM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Statement dated 10 September 1993 by the Government of Thailand on the Agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel

1. The Royal Thai Government is happy to learn that the peaceful process of the Middle East peace negotiations, which Thailand has supported all along, has produced a preliminary agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

2. The Royal Thai Government hopes that this agreement would contribute significantly to the entire Middle East peace process and will enhance its expeditious attainment, so that peace and prosperity will prevail in the Middle East region.

3. The Royal Thai Government hopes that this historic arrangement will lead to further agreements acceptable to all parties concerned, so that a durable peace, with no residual problems, may be achieved.

4. The Royal Thai Government would like to applaud all concerned for their painstaking efforts and noble sacrifices to enable this agreement to become a practical reality.

5. The Royal Thai Government would like to urge all parties to render their full support to enable this peace settlement to become a durable and practical one.

6. The Royal Thai Government will monitor this positive development closely and will render its full support to the peace process through all peaceful means.

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NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26495
26 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement on the recent Palestinian-Israeli agreement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, H.E. Mr. Glafcos Clerides, on 14 September 1993.

I should be grateful if you would provide for the distribution of this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alecos SHAMBOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Cyprus to the United Nations

Annex

Statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus,
H.E. Mr. Glafcos Clerides

The reaching of a peace accord between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, after a long struggle which claimed the lives of thousands of people and caused human suffering and economic destruction, is a historic event which proves that whenever there is goodwill on the part of the conflicting sides, solutions can be found even to issues for which resort to force seemed to be the only solution.

We believe the agreement is a landmark in the process of achieving an overall peace to the Middle East problem and will put an end to the long confrontation between Israel and the Arabs.

We believe that there will be difficulties, but we are certain they will be faced in the same spirit in which the historic agreement has been achieved.

I express the profound satisfaction of the Cypriot people, the Government and my own, for this breakthrough and I offer the warmest congratulations to all those who had the vision, and with great courage, determination and awareness of historic responsibility made the peace agreement possible. At this moment, one cannot but bring to mind the late President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, and Israel's late Prime Minister, Menahem Begin, who, with the assistance of former President Jimmy Carter, opened the road to peace.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26496
26 September 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continued their violations of Iraqi national airspace for purposes of reconnaissance and provocation during the period 13 to 18 September 1993.

13 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 34 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,500 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Zakho, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Rawanduz and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 44 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah and Salman.

14 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 68 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 8,000 to 8,500 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Basra, Qal'at Salih, Samawah, Jalibah and Busayyah.

15 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 14 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah, Ayn Zalah and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 51 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,500 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Khidr, Samawah, Amarah, Shatrah, Jabayish, Salman, Jalibah, Busayyah and the area to the north of Mu'ayanah.

16 September 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile aerial activity was reported in the northern region on 16 September 1993.

(b) Southern region: 40 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Basra, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Amarah, Jalibah, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Busayyah.

At 1245 hours on 16 September 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft penetrated Iraqi airspace flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres over Basra, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Amarah, Jabayish, Nasiriyah, Samawah, the area to the south of Diwaniyah and Jalibah. It left at 1535 hours in the direction of Saudi airspace.

17 September 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile aerial activity was reported in the northern region on 17 September 1993.

(b) Southern region: There was no hostile aerial activity in the southern region on 17 September 1993.

18 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 24 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,500 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Zakho, Tall Afar, Dohuk, Amadiyah and Aqrah.

(b) Southern region: 76 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Basra, Artawi, Qal'at Salih, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Busayyah, Shanafiyah, Jalibah, Lasaf and Ushbayjah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative